Institutional Incentives, Game Equilibrium and Social Justice: Toward a Unified Theory of Pure Jurisprudence
2017年11月29日 09:47 来源:Social Sciences in China Press 作者:Ding Li

  Ding Li

  Center for Research on Public Policy and Legal Institution Design, School of Law, Sun Yat-sen University

  Abstract:This article seeks to make a constructive advance in jurisprudential theory by employing the unified analytical framework of modern social science. We first outline the main ideas of individual rational decision-making and game theory and of social choice and mechanism design, before offering a preliminary discussion of their application to legal issues. The core thesis is that the law in combination with other social norms provides institutional incentives to all actors in society. Legislators’ social justice objectives can be reasonably enforced only as a result of behavioral equilibrium in the social game.

  Keywords:law,social justice,institutional incentive,game equilibrium


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