Tang Lingxiao,a Ouyang Yao b and Huang Zexian c
a and c School of Economics and Management, Changsha University of Science and Technology
b Hunan University of Commerce
Abstract:The BRICS basic infrastructure suffers from a huge financing gap, but their massive foreign exchange reserves lack profitable outlets and member states’ self-contained management costs are extremely high. The coincidence of the need for basic infrastructure investment and the need for profitable foreign exchange reserves are the immediate reasons for setting up the BRICS Development Bank. Comparative advantage and the co-movement of fluctuations in the BRICS member states optimize their cooperative interests. A co- movement game model analysis enables us to deduce the logical necessity for cooperation among the BRICS. Compared with other patterns of cooperation, virtual networks enable this financial cooperation to yield benefits in a short timeframe. The mutually supportive relationship between development and stability in the BRICS economies provides a solid rationale for the establishment of the New Development Bank.
Keywords: The BRICS New Development Bank, international financial cooperation,conjoined demands, mutual influence
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